Modal public announcement logics study how beliefs change after public announcements. However, these logics cannot express the reason for a new belief. Justification logics fill this gap since they can formally represent evidence and justifications for an agent's belief. We present OPAL(K) and JPAL(K), two alternative justification counterparts of Gerbrandy-Groeneveld's public announcement logic PAL(K). We show that PAL(K) is the forgetful projection of OPAL(K), respectively of JPAL(K), and we establish that JPAL(K) partially realizes PAL(K). The question whether a similar result also holds for OPAL(K) is still open.
Introduction
Justification logics are epistemic logics that feature explicit reasons for an agent's knowledge and belief. Instead of an implicit statement A that stands for the agent knows A, justification logics include explicit statements of the form t : A that mean t justifies the agent's knowledge of A. In these statements, the evidence term t may represent a formal mathematical proof of A or an informal reason for A.
Originally, Artemov developed justification logic to provide a constructive semantics for intuitionistic logic. Later these logics were introduced into formal epistemology where they provide a novel approach to certain epistemic puzzles and to several problems of multi-agent systems [1, 2, 3, 4, 7] . Dynamic epistemic logic [20] studies the relationship between communication, knowledge, and belief. It is based on the language of modal logic enriched with statements to express various forms of communication. A basic form of communication is provided by public announcements where a statement A is publicly communicated to all the agents. The logic of public announcements [16, 13] uses a statement [A]B to express that B holds after the public announcement of A.
In this paper, we are interested in belief rather than in knowledge and, hence, rely on Gerbrandy-Groeneveld's axiomatization of public announcements [13] . One of its postulates is
which says, from left to right, that an agent who believes that B must be the case whenever a true fact A is announced will believe B after an actual announcement of A.
To illustrate how this principle works, we briefly recall the following example from [8] . Elite-level frequent flyers can usually check in for their flight at the business counter by presenting their elite membership card, which can also be attached to their luggage to make public their elite status. This check-in rule is known to airline employees. In this situation, it follows by the implication (1) that when Ann presents her elite membership card to Bob at the business counter, he knows that he should check her in.
Modal public announcement logic tells us how beliefs change after public announcements but not why. It is the aim of this paper to formalize possible answers to this why using the approach of justification logic. If we convert the left to right implication from (1) to a statement with explicit justifications, we obtain something like
where s represents the airline's regulations regarding business-counter checkin procedures and t is the reason why Bob starts checking Ann in. The question is how the terms s and t, which represent justifications, relate to each other; in particular, how to arrive at t given s. We use the above example to discuss different answers to this question. There are the following possibilities.
1. t = s. The regulations themselves tell Bob to check Ann in. This option is implemented in the logic JPAL(K), which we developed jointly with Bryan Renne and Joshua Sack [6] .
2. t = ⇑ s. The operator ⇑ represents the inference Bob has to make from the regulations after the elite card is shown. This approach is taken by the logic OPAL(K), which we introduced in [8] .
3. t = ⇑ A s. The inference process explicitly mentions both the regulations, s, and the demonstration of Ann's elite card, A. We do not consider this variant since it would make schematic reasoning impossible. Indeed (1) is an axiom scheme that does not depend on the announcement. Therefore, the operation that represents the update on the level of terms should not depend on the announcement either.
As already argued in [8] , the simplicity of the first option, axiomatized by JPAL(K), may not always be sufficient. Imagine that Ann has been upgraded to business class (say, as a reward for postponing her original flight, which had been overbooked). So, according to the same regulations, she can check in with Bob based on her ticket alone without announcing her elite status, which in our notation is represented by s : B. But Ann may choose to announce her elite status anyways, or [A]s : B in our notation. In JPAL(K), where t = s, after the elite status is announced, t encodes two different reasons for Bob to check Ann in: as a business-class customer and as an elite flyer. By contrast, in OPAL(K), these two reasons are represented by two different terms, s and ⇑ s, of which the latter depends on Ann's elite status while the former is due to the ticket alone. And Bob would want to distinguish between the two reasons because of the difference in baggage allowances: an elite frequent flyer is often allowed to check more luggage for free than an owner of a business-class ticket who has been upgraded from economy. In addition, in this and similar cases, the approach of JPAL(K) implies that the meaning of the regulations changes after public announcements: if Ann has an economy ticket, the regulations do not allow her a businesscounter check-in until she shows her elite card, and then they do. This is a little counterintuitive since the regulations are a legal document whose meaning should not be changed by each public announcement. The use of reason ⇑ s enables us to separate the permanent status of the regulations from their momentary applications influenced by public announcements.
Let us now look at the other direction of (1)-from right to left-and see how the first two options manifest themselves there. The implication states that an agent who will believe B after an announcement of A must believe that, if A is true and announced, B holds after the announcement. For instance, if Charlie, while standing in a long line at the economy checkin counter, sees Ann showing her elite card and being served by Bob at the business counter, [A] B, then Charlie has empirical evidence e that Ann is served at the business counter, [A]e : B. It would be natural for Charlie to believe that having an elite status and showing it gets one to the business counter, (A → [A]B). But it seems even clearer in this case that Charlie's empirical observation e cannot explain the causality of the implication A → [A]B. If before Ann showed up, Charlie had read the sign that invited elite members to the business counter, then Charlie's memory of this sign, refreshed by Ann's actions, could serve as such an explanation. Thus, instead of using e, as in JPAL(K), in this example it also seems better to use ⇓ e, where ⇓ is yet another new operation of our logic OPAL(K).
So far, not much work has been done to provide explicit justifications for dynamic epistemic logic. Besides the already mentioned [6, 8] , there is Renne's earlier research on introducing new evidence [17] and eliminating unreliable evidence [19] in the framework of justification logic. He also presents expressivity results for certain justification logics with announcements [18] .
However, the modal counterparts of Renne's systems do not correspond to any traditional public announcement logic whereas both JPAL(K) and OPAL(K) are intended as justification logics with public announcement operators whose belief dynamics closely corresponds to the modal belief dynamics of Gerbrandy-Groeneveld's modal public announcement logic PAL(K) [13] .
In the next section, we recall the axiomatization and basic properties of PAL(K). In particular, we present the reduction of a PAL(K) formula A to a provably equivalent formula red(A) that does not contain public announcement operators. This reduction facilitates a simple completeness proof for PAL(K) by reducing it to completeness of the basic modal logic K.
As mentioned before, JPAL(K) and OPAL(K) (both with additional positive introspection axioms) were introduced in [6] and [8] respectively where we also established soundness and completeness for these two logics. We recall the definitions of OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) and their semantics in Sections 3 and 4. We reprove soundness and completeness for OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) in Section 5. Since the replacement property does not hold in justification logics, we cannot establish completeness of either logic by reducing it to completeness of the basic justification logic J. Instead we perform a canonic model construction for each of the two logics.
Section 6 is the main part of the paper. It deals with the formal relationship of PAL(K) and JPAL(K), respectively OPAL(K). The relationship is described by means of the notion of forgetful projection: given a justification logic formula A, its forgetful projection A
• is a modal formula that is given by replacing each evidence term in A with . We get the following theorem.
Theorem (Forgetful Projection). For all justification logic formulas A,
More interesting and much more difficult is the converse direction. To formulate it in a precise way, we need the notion of realization: given a modal formula A, a realization of A is a justification logic formula r(A) such that (r(A))
• = A. We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem (Realization). For all modal formulas A that do not contain modalities within announcements,
We establish the Realization Theorem in the following way. First, we reduce the PAL(K) formula A to a provably equivalent formula red(A) that has no announcement operators, i.e., red(A) is a traditional modal logic formula. Then we use realization for modal logic (without public announcements) to obtain a justification logic formula r(red(A)) that realizes red(A). Finally, we 'invert' the reduction from A to red(A) on the justification logic side to obtain a formula r(A) that realizes A.
Forgetful projection
This realization by reduction approach is a novel technique in the realm of justification logic. The closest analog of this method can be found in [11] , where S5 is realized by reducing it to K45. However, there the reversal of the reduction is trivial, while in our setting it requires an involved extension of Fitting's replacement theorem [10] . First, we need replacement also for formulas with public announcements and, second, we need replacement also in negative positions (the original proof in [10] only deals with replacement in positive positions). While we only show this extended replacement theorem for JPAL(K), there seems to be little or no extra work required to prove the same extended replacement theorem for OPAL(K). The problem lies in the application of this replacement theorem to reverse the modal reduction on the justification side for OPAL(K). The exact nature of the problem is too technical to be explained in the introduction and is pointed out in the proof of Theorem 43, Footnote 4. We only mention here that the problem concerns reversing in OPAL(K) the modal update reduction in a negative position. Thus, we obtain realization only for JPAL(K). It is open whether a similar result can be shown for OPAL(K).
The replacement theorem requires that there exist realization functions that satisfy the technical condition of non-self-referentiality on variables. By a result of Kuznets [14] , we know that such realization functions exist for the modal logic K. Therefore, we formulate OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) as justification counterparts of public announcement logic over K. The original versions of these two logics in [6, 8] included axioms for positive introspection, and we claimed in [8] that realization holds for JPAL with positive introspection. However, it is not clear whether there always exist realization functions for positive introspection (i.e., K4) that are non-self-referential on variables. Thus, it is still open whether a realization theorem holds for public announcements in the presence of positive introspection.
The results presented in this paper are based on the conference papers [6, 8] that did not include full proofs.
Modal Public Announcement Logic
In this section, we recall some of the basic definitions and facts concerning the Gerbrandy-Groeneveld modal logic of public introspective announcements [12, 13, 20] , i.e, public announcements that need not be truthful but are trusted by all the agents. Definition 1 (PAL(K) Language). We fix a countable set Prop of atomic propositions. The language of PAL(K) consists of the formulas A ∈ Fml , [·] formed by the grammar
The language Fml of modal formulas without announcements is obtained from the same grammar without the [A]A constructor.
The Gerbrandy-Groeneveld theory PAL(K) of Public Announcement Logic uses the language Fml ,[·] to reason about belief change and public announcements. 
The deductive system PAL(K) is a Hilbert system that consists of the above axioms of PAL(K) and the following rules of modus ponens (MP) and necessitation (N):
We write
Lemma 3 (Admissible Announcement Necessitation, [20] [12, 13, 20] . That means one can express what the situation is after an announcement by saying what the situation was before the announcement. The following lemma formally describes this reduction procedure (for a proof, see, for instance, [20] ). The proof method was first introduced by Plaza in [16] . Remark 7. The above lemma facilitates a completeness proof for PAL(K) by reducing it to completeness of K. The completeness is proved with respect to the class of all Kripke models. To evaluate validity of formulas with announcements, the standard Kripke semantics is extended with a model update operation for introspective announcements. To save space, instead of formulating this semantics, we refer the reader to [20, Section 4.9] and give only a sketch of the completeness proof. Suppose that A ∈ Fml ,[·] is valid. Then red(A) is also valid by Lemma 6 and by soundness of PAL(K), which is easy to show directly. Since red(A) is a formula of Fml , completeness of K yields K red(A) and, hence, PAL(K) red(A) because PAL(K) extends K. Applying Lemma 6 again, we conclude that PAL(K) A. As a corollary of the soundness of PAL(K), since the semantics for PAL(K) extends the standard Kripke semantics, PAL(K) is a conservative extension of K.
Justification Logic
Our language extends the language typically used in justification logic by adding public announcement formulas [A]B and two unary operations on terms, ⇑ and ⇓, to express the update dynamics of evidence.
Definition 8 (Language). In addition to the set of propositions Prop, we fix countable sets Cons of constants and Vars of variables. Our language consists of the terms t ∈ Tm and the formulas A ∈ Fml J formed by the grammar
A term is a ground term if it does not contain variables. The language introduced in [6, 8] for justification logics with public announcements includes additionally an operation ! on terms that is used for positive introspection. Since the logics OPAL(K) and JPAL(K), to be introduced below, do not have an introspection axiom, we can dispense with the ! operation.
Remark 9. To state axioms of our systems JPAL(K) and OPAL(K), we use arbitrary finite sequences of announcements, which is not done in modal public announcement logics. This use of sequences may seem puzzling, especially given that the iteration axiom of PAL(K), which normally allows to replace any such finite sequence with a single announcement, is transferred to JPAL(K) and OPAL(K) as is. But recall that the replacement property does not hold for justification logics, as already mentioned earlier. Replacing single announcements with sequences of announcements in axioms is the minimally invasive solution we have found to ensure the admissibility of the announcement necessitation rule, which is clearly valid semantically. Notation 10 (Sequences of Announcements). σ and τ (with and without subscripts) will denote finite sequences of formulas. ε denotes the empty sequence. Given such a sequence σ = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) and a formula B, the formula [σ]B is defined as follows:
Further, we define σ, B := (A 1 , . . . , A n , B) and B, σ :
We will also need the length |σ| of a sequence σ, which is given by |ε| := 0 and
Definition 11 (OPAL(K) Deductive System). The axioms of OPAL(K) consist of all Fml J -instances of the following schemes:
1.
[σ]A, where A is a classical propositional tautology
The deductive system OPAL(K) is a Hilbert system that consists of the above axioms of OPAL(K) and the following rules of modus ponens (MP) and axiom necessitation (AN):
where σ i 's are (possibly empty) finite sequences of formulas.
We sometimes use some of the same names for both axioms of OPAL(K) and axioms of PAL(K) because it will always be clear from the context which of the two is meant.
Besides OPAL(K), we also consider the deductive system JPAL(K), which does not assign any particular meaning to the two term operations ⇑ and ⇓.
Definition 12 (JPAL(K) Deductive System). The axioms of JPAL(K) are the axioms of OPAL(K) where the two update axiom schemes are replaced by the single scheme
(update)
The deductive system JPAL(K) is a Hilbert system that consists of the axioms of JPAL(K) and the rules (MP) and (AN), where the formula C in (AN) now stands for an axiom of JPAL(K).
We will use OPAL(K) A and JPAL(K) A to express that A is derivable in OPAL(K) and JPAL(K), respectively. If the deductive system does not matter, for instance when A is derivable in both of them, then we use A.
The following example gives some intuition as to how the deductive systems work and what their differences are.
Example 13. For any p ∈ Prop and any c 1 , c 2 ∈ Cons, we have
Proof. We use PR to denote the use of propositional reasoning. By AN for the tautology
By AN for the independence axiom [p]p ↔ p we have
From (4) and (5) we obtain by the application axiom and PR
In OPAL(K) we get from (6) by the update axiom ⇑ and PR
In JPAL(K) we get from (6) by the update axiom and PR
We see that, independent of the truth value of an atomic proposition p, after p is announced, there is a reason to believe p. In JPAL(K) this reason is given by the term c 1 · c 2 . In OPAL(K) the term is ⇑(c 1 · c 2 ). In the latter case, the presence of ⇑ in the evidence term clearly signifies that this evidence for p is contingent on a prior public announcement. However, the exact content of such a public announcement, p in our case, is not recorded in the term. This design decision enables us to avoid the overcomplexification of the language and is similar to the introspection operation in the traditional justification logics: !t is evidence for t : A whenever t is evidence for A; however, the formula A is not recorded in the term !t.
Remark 14. The announcement-free fragment of OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) (that is the first three axiom schemes with σ = ε, rule MP, and rule AN, restricted to c 1 : · · · : c n : C) is the well-known justification logic J (see [5] ).
The following lemma states a standard property of justification logics that holds for OPAL(K) and JPAL(K); it can be proved by an easy induction on the length of derivation.
Lemma 15 (Internalization). If C 1 , . . . , C n A, then there is a term t(y 1 , . . . , y n ) for fresh variables y 1 , . . . , y n such that y 1 : C 1 , . . . , y n : C n t(y 1 , . . . , y n ) : A .
Corollary 16 (Constructive Necessitation). For any formula A, if
A, then there is a ground term t such that t : A.
Semantics
We adapt the Kripke-style semantics for Justification Logic due to Fitting [9] . Our semantics uses Kripke models augmented by evidence functions that relate each world-term pair (w, t) to a set of formulas E(w, t) that the term t can justify at the world w.
Definition 17 (Frame). A frame is a pair (W, R) that consists of a set W = ∅ of (possible) worlds and of an accessibility relation R ⊆ W × W .
Definition 18 (Evidence Function). A function
is called evidence function if it satisfies the following closure conditions:
1. Axioms: if c : A is derivable by the AN-rule, then A ∈ E(w, c) for any w ∈ W .
2. Application: if (A → B) ∈ E(w, t) and A ∈ E(w, s), then B ∈ E(w, t·s).
3.
Sum: E(w, s) ∪ E(w, t) ⊆ E(w, s + t) for any s, t ∈ Tm and any w ∈ W .
In a model of OPAL(K) or JPAL(K), there is an evidence function E σ for each finite sequence σ of formulas. The idea is that the evidence function E σ models the "evidential situation" that arises after the formulas in σ have been publicly announced.
Definition 19 (Model)
. A model is a structure M = (W, R, E, ν), where (W, R) is a frame, ν : Prop → P(W ) is a valuation, and function E maps finite sequences σ of formulas to evidence functions E σ . An OPAL(K) model satisfies the following three conditions:
A JPAL(K) model satisfies (9) and, instead of (7) and (8), the condition
Conditions (7), (8), (9), and (10) correspond to the update axiom ⇑, the update axiom ⇓, the iteration axiom, and the update axiom of JPAL(K) respectively.
Remark 20. Our notion of model is non-empty. Simple sample models for OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) can be found in [8] and [6] , respectively.
Definition 21 (Truth in a Model). A ternary relation M, w
A for formula A being satisfied at a world w ∈ W in a model M = (W, R, E, ν) is defined by induction on the structure of A:
• M, w p if and only if w ∈ ν(p).
• Boolean connectives behave classically.
• M, w t : A if and only if 1) A ∈ E ε (w, t) and 2) M, v A for all v ∈ W with R(w, v).
• M, w [A]B if and only if
is defined as follows: (7)- (9) from Def. 19 and hence also is an (9) and (10) and hence also is a JPAL(K) model.
To illustrate how the semantics works, we prove a semantic version of the result from Example 13.
Example 22. For any p ∈ Prop and any c 1 , c 2 ∈ Cons, we have
Proof. Let M = (W, R, E, ν) be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . By Def. 18.1, we have (
Assume that M is a JPAL(K) model. Then, by condition (10) from Def. 19, we have p ∈ E p (w, c 1 · c 2 ). As above we then find M p , w (c 1 · c 2 ) : p and M, w [p](c 1 · c 2 ) : p.
Soundness and Completeness
Lemma 23 (Soundness). For all formulas A ∈ Fml J , we have
Proof. As usual the proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of A. We only show the cases concerning the axioms about announcements.
Independence (OPAL(K) and JPAL(K)
). M, w [σ]p iff M σ , w p iff w ∈ ν σ (p) iff w ∈ ν(p) iff M, w p.
Normality (OPAL(K) and JPAL(K)
3. Functionality (OPAL(K) and
Update (JPAL(K)). M, w [σ]t : (A → [A]B) is equivalent to the conjunction of
and
By the condition (10) on E from Def. 19 , we obtain that (11) if and only if B ∈ E σ,A (w, t) .
Moreover, (12) is equivalent to
This is equivalent to
which, in turn, is equivalent to
The conjunction of this and (13) 
Update ⇑ (OPAL(K)
). This case is similar to the ⇒ direction of the update case for JPAL(K).
6. Update ⇓ (OPAL(K)). This case is similar to the ⇐ direction of the update case for JPAL(K).
7. Iteration (OPAL(K) and JPAL(K)). First we show that
R σ,A,B (u, v) is equivalent to
which, in turn, is equivalent to R σ,A∧[A]B (u, v) and thus (14) is established.
The case for iteration is now as follows:
if and only if M σ,A,B , w C .
By condition (9) on E from Def. 19 and by (14) , this is equivalent to
The traditional modal logic reduction approach (see Remark 7) to establishing completeness is not possible in the presence of justifications since the replacement property does not hold in Justification Logic (see [10, Sect. 6] for a detailed discussion of the replacement property in Justification Logic). That means, in particular, that A ↔ B does not imply t : A ↔ t : B, which would be an essential step in the proof of a justification-analog of Lemma 6. Thus, it is not possible to transfer the completeness of J (see [9, 15] ) to OPAL(K) or JPAL(K). We will, instead, provide a canonical model construction to prove the completeness of OPAL(K) and JPAL(K). In the following we let S stand for either OPAL(K) or JPAL(K).
Definition 24 (Maximal S-Consistent Sets). A set Φ of Fml J -formulas is called S-consistent if there is a formula that cannot be derived from Φ in S. A set Φ is called maximal S-consistent if it is consistent but has no consistent proper extensions.
It can be easily shown that maximal S-consistent sets contain all axioms of S and are closed under modus ponens and axiom necessitation.
Definition 25 (Canonical S Model). We define the canonical S model M = (W, R, E, ν) as follows:
To establish completeness, we need to know that the canonical model is a model.
Lemma 26 (Correctness of the Canonical Model).
The canonical
Proof. First, we observe that the set W is non-empty: by Remark 20, there exists a model and the set of all formulas that are true at some world of the model is maximally consistent. We next show that E σ is an evidence function for each σ.
• Axioms. For any c : A derivable by AN, [σ]c : A is also derivable for any σ. Hence, [σ]c : A ∈ w and A ∈ E σ (w, c).
• Application. Assume A → B ∈ E σ (w, t) and A ∈ E σ (w, s). We then have [σ]t : (A → B) ∈ w and [σ]s : A ∈ w. By the application and normality axioms, we get [σ](t · s) : B ∈ w. Thus, B ∈ E σ (w, t · s).
• Sum. This is similar to the previous case.
For a canonical OPAL(K) model M it remains to be shown that M satisfies conditions (7), (8) , and (9) [A] ⇑ t : B ∈ w, which is equivalent to B ∈ E σ,A (w, ⇑ t). Conditions (8) and (9) are shown similarly using the update axiom ⇓ and the iteration axiom respectively.
For a canonical JPAL(K) model M it remains to be shown that M satisfies conditions (10) and (9) And now case 5. 
rk([A][B]C) = (2 + rk(A)) · (2 + rk(B)) · rk(C) = (4 + 2rk(A) + 2rk(B) + rk(A)rk(B)) · rk(C) ≥ (6 + 2rk(B) + rk(A)rk(B)) · rk(C) > (2 + 3 + (2 + rk(A)) · rk(B)) · rk(C) = (2 + rk(¬(A → ¬[A]B))) · rk(C) = rk([A ∧ [A]B]C) .

Lemma 30 (Truth Lemma
)
D = [A][B]C. Suppose [A][B]C ∈ w. By the iteration axiom, this is equivalent to [A ∧ [A]B]C ∈ w. By the induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to M, w [A ∧ [A]B]C, which, by the soundness of the iteration axiom, is equivalent to M, w [A][B]C.
As usual, the Truth Lemma implies completeness, which, as a corollary, yields announcement necessitation. 
Forgetful Projection and Realization
This section deals with the relationship between PAL(K) and dynamic justification logics. We show that for any theorem of either OPAL(K) or JPAL(K), its forgetful projection, which is obtained by replacing each term with , is a theorem of PAL(K).
Definition 33 (Forgetful Projection). The mapping
is defined as follows:
• commutes with connectives ¬ and → , (t : A)
For a sequence σ = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of Fml J -formulas, we define σ • to be the sequence (A 1
• , . . . , A n • ) of Fml ,[·] -formulas. In particular, ε • := ε.
Theorem 34 (Forgetful Projection of JPAL(K) and OPAL(K)). For all formulas
Proof. We use induction on a derivation in JPAL(K), respectively in OPAL(K). We need to show that the statement holds for all the axioms of JPAL(K), respectively of OPAL(K), for all instances of the rule AN, and is preserved by the rule MP, the two rules being common for the two logics. To simplify dealing with axioms, we first note that for each sequence σ of Fml J -formulas, there exists a formula
. This is trivial if |σ| = 1 and follows from the modal iteration axiom if |σ| > 1. If σ = ε, U ε := p ∨ ¬p for some proposition p.
Thus, to show that forgetful projections of all axioms, of JPAL(K) and OPAL(K), are derivable in PAL(K), it is sufficient to consider these projections with [U σ ] substituted for [σ • ]. Most of the axioms are actually common between the two logics, which makes the proof shorter. If A is a propositional tautology, so is A
• . Therefore, [U σ ]A • can be derived in PAL(K) by using the announcement necessitation rule, which is known to be admissible in PAL(K) by Lemma 3. Similarly, the application and sum axioms have a form [σ]C where C • is a theorem of PAL(K): in case of the application axiom,
, it is an axiom of K; in case of the sum axiom, 
• are instances of the modal independence, normality, and functionality axioms, respectively. Finally, the remaining ax-
• is one direction of the equivalence in the modal update axiom. It remains to note that
is known to be admissible in PAL(K).
The forgetful projection of the AN rule has a form [
where the derivability of C • in PAL(K) has just been demonstrated. Therefore, it is sufficient to use the modal necessitation rule n times and the announcement necessitation rule |σ 1 | + · · · + |σ n | times to get the desired result. A much more difficult question is whether a dynamic justification logic, such as JPAL(K) or OPAL(K), can realize PAL(K): that is, whether for any theorem A of PAL(K), it is possible to replace each in A with some term such that the resulting formula is a dynamic justification validity.
In the remainder of this paper we present the first realization technique for dynamic justification logics and establish a partial realization result for JPAL(K): it can realize formulas A that do not contain operators within announcements. Our main idea is to reduce realization of PAL(K) to realization of K. In our proof, we rely on notions and techniques introduced by Fitting [10] .
Definition 35 (Substitution). A substitution is a mapping from variables to terms. If A is a formula and σ is a substitution, we write Aσ to denote the result of simultaneously replacing each variable x in A with the term xσ.
The following lemma is standard in justification logics and can be proved by a simple induction on the derivation of A.
Lemma 36 (Substitution Lemma). For every formula A of Fml J and every substitution σ,
In most justification logics, in addition to this substitution of proof terms for proof variables, the substitution of formulas for propositions is also possible (see [2] ). However, the latter type of substitution typically fails in logics with public announcements, as it does in both JPAL(K) and OPAL(K). The following realization result for the logic K is due to Brezhnev [5] ; the additional result about non-self-referentiality on variables follows from the stronger statement that K can be realized without any self-referential cycles of arbitrary terms, proved in [14] .
Theorem 39 (Realization for K). If A is a theorem of K, then for any properly annotated version A of A , there is a realization function r that is non-self-referential on variables over A and such that r(A) is provable in J.
Clearly, (r(A))
• = A .
In order to formulate the replacement theorem for JPAL(K), a technical result necessary for demonstrating the partial realization theorem for JPAL(K), we use the following standard convention: whenever D(q) and A are formulas in the same language, D(A) is the result of replacing all occurrences of the proposition q in D(q) with A. In most cases, q has only one occurrence in D(q) that is not within announcements.
For the rest of this section, we consider only formulas A ∈ Fml ,[·] and their annotated versions that do not contain modal operators within announcements: i.e., if [B]C is a subformula of A, then B does not contain modal operators.
We will use a theorem that was first proved by Fitting [10] for replacement in positive positions in LP. We use his method in a richer language and for a different logic and also use replacement in both positive and negative positions. Thus, in the interests of self-containment, we give a more general formulation that we need and prove it. The proof is an adaptation of Fitting's proof from [10] .
Theorem 40 (Restricted Realization Modification for JPAL(K)). Assume the following:
H-1. A proposition p has exactly 1 one occurrence in a properly annotated formula X(p) that is outside of announcements. X(A) and X(B) are properly annotated formulas with no modalities within announcements.
H-2. r 1 is a realization function, non-self-referential on variables over X(A).
H-3. If p occurs positively in
If p occurs negatively in X(p), JPAL(K) r 1 (B) → r 1 (A).
Then for each subformula ϕ(p) of X(p) that occurs outside of announcements, there is some realization/substitution pair r ϕ , σ ϕ such that:
C-3. σ ϕ meets the no new variable condition, i.e., the only variable that may occur in xσ ϕ is x; C-4. If r 1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B), then r ϕ is also non-self-referential on variables over X(B).
Proof.
Assume that hypotheses H-1, H-2, and H-3 hold. We proceed by induction on the complexity of the subformula ϕ(p). Call a subformula occurrence ϕ(p) of X(p) good provided there is some r ϕ , σ ϕ such that C-1, C-2, C-3, and C-4 hold; we also say r ϕ , σ ϕ is a witness to the goodness of ϕ(p). 2 We show that every subformula occurrence of X(p) that is outside of announcements is good.
Let ϕ(p) be a subformula occurrence of X(p) that is outside of announcements. Then this occurrence must be either positive or negative in X(p). Assume as an induction hypothesis, that all its proper subformula occurrences are good; note that they must also be outside of announcements. We show ϕ(p) itself is good. There are several cases to consider.
Base case. If ϕ(p) is atomic, set r ϕ := r 1 and σ ϕ to be the identity substitution.
C-2 and C-3. The identity substitution lives on input positions in any formula and meets the no new variable condition.
C-4. If r 1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B), so is r ϕ = r 1 . C-1. Here further subcases have to be considered: C-1. Base subcase 1. ϕ(p) = q, where q is a proposition different from p. Whether this occurrence of q is positive or negative in X(p),
which is clearly derivable in JPAL(K). C-1. Base subcase 2. ϕ(p) = p. This subformula occurs in X(p) exactly once. If it occurs positively, C-1 requires JPAL(K) r 1 (ϕ(A))σ ϕ → r ϕ (ϕ(B)) or JPAL(K) r 1 (A) → r 1 (B), which follows from H-3 for the positively occurring p.
If p occurs negatively, C-1 requires JPAL(K) r ϕ (ϕ(B)) → r 1 (ϕ(A))σ ϕ or JPAL(K) r 1 (B) → r 1 (A), which follows from H-3 for the negatively occurring p.
Negation case. If ϕ(p) = ¬θ(p) and r θ , σ θ has been constructed, set r ϕ := r θ and σ ϕ := σ θ . We show that r ϕ , σ ϕ witnesses the goodness of an occurrence of ¬θ(p) in X(p) under the assumption that r θ , σ θ witnesses the goodness of the corresponding occurrence of θ(p).
C-2, C-3, and C-4 for ϕ(p) easily follow from C-2, C-3, and C-4 for θ(p) because r ϕ = r θ and σ ϕ = σ θ . For C-2, it is sufficient to note that any 2i occurring in θ(p) also occurs in ¬θ(p).
C-1. The statement that needs to be demonstrated depends on the polarity of this occurrence of ¬θ(p). We only show one of the two cases since the other is analogous. Let this occurrence be positive. Then the corresponding occurrence of θ(p) is negative and JPAL(K) r θ (θ(B)) → r 1 (θ(A))σ θ by C-1 for θ(p). By contraposition, JPAL(K) r 1 (¬θ(A))σ ϕ → r ϕ (¬θ(B)), which is C-1 for the positively occurring ¬θ(p).
Implication case. If ϕ(p)
. This r ϕ is well-defined, i.e., n cannot occur in both θ(B) and η(B), since θ(B) → η(B) is a subformula of X(B), which is properly annotated by H-1. We show that r ϕ , σ ϕ witnesses the goodness of an occurrence of θ(p) → η(p) in X(p) whenever r θ , σ θ and r η , σ η witness the goodness of the corresponding occurrences of θ(p) and η(p).
It is also necessary to show that our r ϕ is a realization function, i.e., r ϕ (2i) = x i . Since r θ (2i) = r η (2i) = r 1 (2i) = x i , we only need to show that neither σ η , when 2i occurs in θ(B), nor σ θ , when 2i occurs in η(B), changes x i . Given the symmetry of the two situations, we only consider the former, when 2i occurs in θ(B). Since θ(B) → η(B) is a subformula of X(B), which is properly annotated by H-1, θ(B) can share no annotations with η(B), and even less so with η(p). Thus, x i is not in input position in η(p) and is not changed by σ η , which lives on input positions in η(p) by C-2. This completes the proof that r ϕ is a realization function.
We now show that the two substitutions commute: σ θ σ η = σ η σ θ . By C-2 for θ(p) and η(p), the substitutions σ θ and σ η live on input positions in θ(p) and η(p), respectively. These input positions do not overlap since θ(p) → η(p) is a subformula of X(p), which is properly annotated by H-1. Hence, each variable is changed by at most one of these substitutions. Clearly, if neither substitution changes x i , then neither composition changes it either, so that x i σ θ σ η = x i σ η σ θ = x i . If one of the substitutions, call it σ, changes x i , the other substitution, call it τ , changes neither x i nor x i σ, the latter because the only variable it contains is x i by C-3 for one of θ(p) or η(p). Hence,
C-2. By C-2 for θ(p) and for η(p), we have
C-3 for ϕ(p) easily follows from C-3 for θ(p) and η(p). C-4. Suppose r 1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B). Then both r θ and r η are so, too, by C-4 for θ(p) and η(p). Hence, a variable x k does not occur in r 1 (n), in r θ (n), or in r η (n) for any n occurring in Z(B) for some subformula 2k Z(B) of X(B). Since, by C-3 for θ(p) and η(p), neither σ θ nor σ η introduces new variables, the variable x k does not occur in r θ (n)σ η or in r η (n)σ θ either. Thus, x k does not occur in r ϕ (Z(B)) and r ϕ is non-self-referential on variables over X(B).
C-1. The statement that needs to be demonstrated depends on the polarity of this occurrence of θ(p) → η(p). We only show one of the two cases since the other is analogous. Let this occurrence be positive. The the corresponding occurrence of θ(p) is negative and the corresponding occurrence of η(p) is positive. In order to show C-1, i.e.,
It is sufficient to show
By C-1 for this negative occurrence of θ(p), JPAL(K) r θ (θ(B)) → r 1 (θ(A))σ θ . Hence, JPAL(K) r θ (θ(B))σ η → r 1 (θ(A))σ θ σ η by the Substitution Lemma, which can be rewritten as JPAL(K) r ϕ (θ(B)) → r 1 (θ(A))σ ϕ . This yields (15) . By C-1 for this positive occurrence of η(P ), JPAL(K) r 1 (η(A))σ η → r η (η(B)). Hence, by the Substitution Property, JPAL(K) r 1 (η(A))σ η σ θ → r η (η(B))σ θ , which can be rewritten as JPAL(K) r 1 (η(A))σ ϕ → r ϕ (η(B)). This yields (16) .
Modal case. If ϕ(p) = i θ(p) and r θ , σ θ has been constructed. Unlike in other cases, this subformula, due to i in it, can only occur once in X(p). Accordingly we can talk about the goodness and polarity of this subformula rather than about those of its occurrences. The parity of i determines whether ϕ(p) is a positive or a negative subformula. We show that r ϕ , σ ϕ witnesses the goodness of the subformula of i θ(p) in X(p) under the assumption that r θ , σ θ witnesses the goodness of the corresponding occurrence of θ(p). In the modal case, the construction of r ϕ and σ ϕ depends on the polarity of ϕ(p) in X(p).
Modal subcase 1. If i θ(p) is a positive subformula of X(p) so that i is odd, set σ ϕ := σ θ . By C-1 for this positive occurrence of θ(p), JPAL(K)
and set
C-2 and C-3 for ϕ(p) easily follow from C-2 and C-3 for θ(p) because σ ϕ = σ θ . For C-2, it is sufficient to note that any 2j occurring in θ(p) also occurs in i θ(p).
C-4. Suppose r 1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B). Then r θ is so, too, by C-4 for θ(p). Hence, a variable x k does not occur in either r 1 (Z(B)) or r θ (Z(B)) for any subformula 2k Z(B) of X(B). The only change from r θ (Z(B)) to r ϕ (Z(B)) happens in the realization of i if i occurs in Z(B): r θ (i) becomes [u 1 · r 1 (i)]σ θ . Given that, in this case, x k does not occur in r 1 (i), u 1 contains no variables, and σ θ does not introduce new variables by C-3 for θ(p), the variable x k does not occur in r ϕ (Z(B)). Hence, r ϕ is non-self-referential on variables over X(B).
) follows from (17) by the application axiom and MP. Since
is a subformula of X(B), which is properly annotated by H-1, the index i does not occur in θ(B) so that r ϕ (θ(B)) = r θ (θ(B)). Thus, given that σ ϕ = σ θ and
which is C-1 for the positive subformula ϕ(p).
Modal subcase 2. If i θ(p) is a negative subformula of X(p) so that i = 2j is even, set r ϕ := r θ . By C-1 for this negative occurrence of θ(p), JPAL(K) r θ (θ(B)) → r 1 (θ(A))σ θ . By Internalization, construct a ground term u 1 such that
C-4 for ϕ(p) trivially follows from C-4 for θ(p). C-2 and C-3. Since σ ϕ differs from σ θ only on x j , it is sufficient to note two things. First, the only variable in x j σ ϕ = u 1 · x j is x j so that C-3 for ϕ(p) follows from C-3 for θ(p). Second, x j is in input position in 2j θ(p) and any input position in θ(p) is also an input position in 2j θ(p) so that C-2 for ϕ(p) follows from C-2 for θ(p).
C-1. JPAL(K) x j : r θ (θ(B)) → u 1 · x j : r 1 (θ(A))σ θ follows from (18) by the application axiom and MP. Since r ϕ (ϕ(B)) = r θ ( 2j θ(B)) = x j : r θ (θ(B)) and
is a subformula of X(A) and r 1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(A) by H-2, the variable x j does not occur in r 1 (θ(A)). Consequently,
Thus, we have obtained C-1 for the negative subformula ϕ(p):
Announcement case. If ϕ(p) = [θ]η(p) and r η , σ η has been constructed, set σ ϕ := σ η and r ϕ (n) := r η (n) if n occurs in η(B) r 1 (n) otherwise.
Recall that p does not occur within announcements like θ. We show that r ϕ , σ ϕ witnesses the goodness of an occurrence of [θ]η(p) in X(p) under the assumption that r η , σ η witnesses the goodness of the corresponding occurrence of η(P ). It is easy to see that r ϕ is a realization function. C-2 and C-3 for ϕ(p) easily follow from C-2 and C-3 for η(p) because σ ϕ = σ η . For C-2, it is sufficient to note that any 2j occurring in η(p) also occurs in [θ]η(p).
C-4. Suppose r 1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B). Then r η is too by C-4 for η(p). Hence, a variable x k does not occur in either r 1 (n) or r η (n) for any n occurring in Z(B) for some subformula 2k Z(B) of X(B). Thus, x k does not occur in r ϕ (Z(B)) and r ϕ is non-self-referential on variables over X(B).
C-1. The statement that needs to be demonstrated depends on the polarity of this occurrence of [θ]η(p). We only show one of the two cases since the other is analogous. Let this occurrence be positive. Then the corresponding occurrence of η(p) is also positive. In order to show C-1, i.e., given that θ contains no modalities, to show JPAL(K) [θ]r 1 (η(A))σ ϕ → [θ]r ϕ (η(B)), it is sufficient to apply the admissible announcement necessitation rule, the normality axiom, and MP to JPAL(K) r 1 (η(A))σ ϕ → r ϕ (η(B)), which is the same as JPAL(K) r 1 (η(A))σ η → r η (η(B)), i.e., as C-1 for this positive occurrence of η(p).
After proving this theorem, general enough to carry the induction through, we formulate a weaker statement we are going to use to prove realization:
Corollary 41 (Replacement for JPAL(K)). Assume the following:
1. A proposition p has exactly one occurrence in a properly annotated formula X(p) that is outside of announcements. X(A) and X(B) are properly annotated formulas with no modalities within announcements.
2. r 1 is a realization function, non-self-referential on variables over X(A) and over X(B).
If p occurs positively in
Then there exists a realization function r and a substitution σ such that
and r is non-self-referential on variables over X(B).
It remains to extend the notions of one-step reduction and of reduction to annotated modal formulas (with announcements). To achieve this it is sufficient to replace the 4th row in the table in (3) by
The functions red 1 and red for annotated formulas are defined the same way as in Definition 5 but based on the new set of reductions. Accordingly, red 1 (A) is an annotated formula and red(A) is an annotated formula without announcements whenever A is an annotated formula. Since the only difference in how red 1 works on Fml ,[·] -formulas and on annotated formulas is such that erasing annotations in a pair of redex/reduct of the annotated red 1 yields a pair of redex/reduct of the unannotated red 1 , the following lemma is not very surprising: We now have all the ingredients sufficient to establish our realization theorem. The following diagram shows how we obtain it. We start with a formula D ∈ Fml , [·] . Taking its arbitrary properly annotated version D, using annotated reduction from Lemma 42, K realization from Theorem 39, and replacement from Corollary 41, we construct a formula r(D) ∈ Fml J that realizes D. It is easy to see that (r(D)) and Reduct is the reduct of Redex. We want to apply Corollary 41 to X(p), Reduct, Redex, and r N −i+1 . Assumption 1 is satisfied because D N −i and D N −i+1 are properly annotated and by definition of red 1 (recall also that an outermost redex never occurs within announcements). That r N −i+1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(Reduct) = D N −i+1 follows from the induction hypothesis. Looking at the five types of redexes and their reducts, it is easy to check that r N −i+1 is also non-self-referential on variables over X(Redex) because the substitution of Redex for Reduct at p in X(p) never introduces new modalities and never moves modalities into the scope of other modalities (recall that announcements contain no modalities). Hence, assumption 2 is satisfied. It remains to note that r(Redex) ↔ r(Reduct) is one of the axioms of JPAL(K) 4 for any realization function r, including r N −i+1 , so that assumption 3 is also satisfied, independent of the polarity of p in X(p) In general, the outer in A's in the reduct will be realized by different terms, and we currently lack methods of merging terms within announcements.
Remark 45. Unfortunately, adapting this proof to OPAL(K) presents certain challenges. The problem is that in order to 'invert' the reduction from PAL(K) to K, we need to apply replacement also in negative positions. This is only possible because in the update axiom (update) of JPAL(K), we have the same evidence term on both sides of the equivalence. If, like in OPAL(K), we work with update operations ⇑ and ⇓ on terms, then we end up with different terms in the update axioms, which prevents the use of Fitting's replacement at negative positions.
Conclusion
We present JPAL(K) and OPAL(K), two alternative justification logic counterparts of Gerbrandy-Groeneveld's modal public announcement logic PAL(K). For the semantics, we use a combination of the traditional semantics for public announcement logic (where an agent rejects as impossible the worlds that are inconsistent with the announcement made) and evidence functions from epistemic models for justification logic (that specify for each world which formulas an evidence term can justify). We then show soundness and completeness (by a canonical model construction) for JPAL(K) and OPAL(K).
The main result of the paper is a realization theorem stating that JPAL(K) realizes all the theorems of PAL(K) that do not contain modalities within announcements. To obtain this result we have to extend Fitting's replacement theorem such that, first, it works in the context of public announcements and, second, it allows replacement also in negative positions.
Finally, it should be noted that our novel realization method does not rely on a cut-free deductive system for PAL(K). Its constructiveness, however, depends on constructive realization for the modal logic K, to which we reduce PAL(K).
